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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter based on its Order, dated 
November 9, 2000, in which it granted Plaintiff Stephen L. Peterson's Petition for 
Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order, pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, and under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Did the District Court err in granting partial summary judgment in favor of 
Defendant Swire Pacific Holdings, Inc. dba Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Salt Lake, 
Swire Pacific Holdings, Inc. dba Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Salt Lake aka Swire 
Coca-Cola, and Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Salt Lake (hereinafter referred to as 
"Swire")1 finding as a matter of law that the Release entered into by Plaintiff/Petitioner 
Stephen L. Peterson (hereinafter "Mr. Peterson"), dated August 4, 1993, had the effect of 
releasing Swire from any and all liability for which it may be vicariously liable for the 
actions or inactions of its employee Thomas Stengel and, therefore, dismissing Count I 
(Vicarious Liability/Respondeat Superior) of Peterson's Complaint with prejudice. 
II. Did the District Court err in granting partial summary judgment in favor of 
Defendant Swire based on the alternative finding that if for some reason the Release does 
not release the vicarious liability of Swire, then Swire is entitled as a matter of law to a 
Mr. Peterson's brief refers to these Defendants as "Coca-Cola". Given that there are 
other defendants named in the action which are also referred to as Coca-Cola, this 
Defendant asserts that the appropriate way in which to refer to it is "Swire". 
1 
credit of $350,000 (consisting of $50,000 paid to Mr. Peterson by Nationwide Insurance 
Co., the liability insurer for Thomas Stengel, and $300,000 paid to Mr. Peterson by 
American States Insurance Co., the underinsured motorist insurer for Mr. Peterson) 
against any judgment based on the Swire's vicarious liability for the acts of Thomas 
Stengel.2 
A. Preservation For Appeal 
The issues on appeal both derive from the Court's Order Granting Swire's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and are preserved for purposes of appeal based on Peterson's 
Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order. See Order Granting Defendant's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at Petitioner's Addendum Exhibit 3, Record Index 
at pp. 352-54. 
2 As part of Mr. Peterson's Statement of Issues on Appeal concerning the credit of 
$350,000.00, Mr. Peterson states: 
II. Did the District Court commit reversible error in finding and ordering that 
Defendants are entitled to a credit in the amount of $350,000, the amount paid to 
Plaintiff by Nationwide Insurance, insurance carrier for Thomas Stengel, and by 
American States Insurance, Plaintiffs underinsured carriers and that American 
States Insurance Company has no subrogation right against the defendant for 
amounts paid to Stephen Peterson in compliance with the UIM coverage." 
See Brief of Petitioner at p. 1. The trial court's Order Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, dated August 28, 2000, does not reflect the second part of 
that statement and does not address American State's subrogation right. See Order 
Granting Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at Petitioner's Addendum 
Exhibit 3, Rec. 352-54. However, the ruling regarding the credit has that resulting effect 
that American States has no right against Swire to recover $300,000.00 it paid for 
underinsured motorist coverage. 
2 
B. Standard of Review 
This interlocutory appeal arises from the district court's grant of partial summary 
judgment in favor of Swire. "Summary Judgment should be granted only if there has 
been a showing 'that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Booth v. Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund, 
Inc., 2000 UT 13, f 28, 20 P.2d 319, 324-25 (Utah 2000). In reviewing the grant of 
summary judgment, appellate courts review trial court's 'legal decisions for correctness, 
giving no deference, and review of facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. Quoting J.R. Simplot Co. v. Sales King Int'l., 
Inc., 2000 UT 92, f 13, 17 P.3d at 1100. 
C. Law of Central Importance 
The interpretation of the Utah Joint Obligations Act, Utah Code Ann. 15-4-1 
through 15-4-5 and the Utah Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 through 
78-27-42 are determinative of or have central importance to the appeal. These sections of 
the Utah Code, for the relevant period of time of the accident, are set forth in full in 
Addendum Exhibit 1 of this Brief. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This action arises from an automobile accident which occurred on Wednesday 
February 12, 1992 at approximately 10:00 a.m. in the morning in which the Plaintiff 
Stephen L. Peterson, while driving, was involved in a head-on collision with a vehicle 
being driven by Thomas Stengel (hereinafter "Mr. Stengel"). At the time of the accident, 
Mr. Stengel was employed by Swire as a merchandiser and was driving his wife's vehicle 
on a business call from one retail store to another when the accident occurred. Mr. 
Stengel fell asleep while driving along 900 East, crossed the center line and collided with 
Mr. Peterson's vehicle. 
Approximately eighteen months after the accident, on August 4, 1993, Mr. 
Peterson, along with his wife Gayle Peterson and his attorney, David Goodwill, executed 
a Release of All Claims. The Release settled Mr. Peterson's claims against Mr. Stengel 
for the accident in exchange for $50,000.00 paid by Mr. Stengel's automobile liability 
insurer Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter "Nationwide"). 
Thereafter, Mr. Peterson made a claim for underinsured motorist coverage for the 
automobile accident with his automobile insurer American States Insurance Company 
(hereinafter "American States"). In the fall of 1994, American States entered into a 
settlement agreement with Mr. Peterson for underinsured motorist coverage paying Mr. 
Peterson $300,000.00. When finalizing Mr. Peterson's underinsured motorist claim with 
4 
American States, Mr. Peterson's counsel learned that Mr. Stengel was employed by and 
was working for Swire at the time of the accident. 
B. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition At The District Court Level 
On or about February 9, 1996, American States, as alleged subrogee, and Mr. 
Peterson filed the above-captioned action suing Swire and Coca-Cola entities for the 
injuries Mr. Peterson sustained in the automobile accident involving Mr. Stengel. Mr. 
Peterson alleges causes of action against Swire for: 1) vicarious liability/respondeat 
superior for the negligence of Mr. Stengel in operating his automobile, 2) for negligent 
supervision of Mr. Stengel, and 3) for punitive damages. 
After several years of discovery, Swire filed a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment in May 2000 asserting that: 1) Mr. Peterson's cause of action for vicarious 
liability/respondeat superior should be dismissed based on the effect and enforcement of 
the Release executed by Mr. Peterson on August 4,1993; or in the alternative, setting off 
any award Mr. Peterson receives for the cause of action for vicarious liability/ respondeat 
superior by $350,000.00, the amount already paid to him for Mr. Stengel's liability; and 2) 
Mr. Peterson's claim for punitive damages against Swire should be dismissed for lack of any 
3
 It appears that Mr. Peterson never served Coca-Cola USA; Coca-Cola USA 
Operations; Coca-Cola USA (BOD) Bottling Operations Department or Coca-Cola 
Fountain. 
The action also appears to be a subrogation action pursued by American States in the 
name of Stephen L. Peterson seeking compensation for the underinsured motorist 
coverage it paid to Mr. Peterson. 
5 
evidence. On August 8, 2000, Judge L.A. Dever heard oral argument on Swire's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, and granted the Motion on all counts. Judge Dever executed 
the Order granting partial summary judgment on August 28, 2000, making the following 
specific findings: 
1. Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice; 
2. The release entered into by Stephen L. Peterson, 
dated August 4, 1993, had the effect of releasing Swire Pacific 
Holdings, Inc. dba Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Salt Lake, 
Swire Pacific Holdings, Inc. dba Coca-Cola Bottling Company 
of Salt Lake aka Swire Coca-Cola, and Coca-Cola Bottling 
Company of Salt Lake from any and all liability for which they 
may be vicariously liable for the actions or inactions of Thomas 
Stengel and, therefore, Count I (Vicarious Liability/Respondeat 
Superior) of plaintiffs complaint is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice; 
3. There is no evidentiary or legal basis which 
requires reforming, voiding, or otherwise failing to enforce the 
release of August 4, 1993; 
4. If for some reason, the release does not release 
the vicarious liability of said defendants, then said defendants 
are entitled to a credit of $350,000 (consisting of $50,000 paid 
to plaintiff by Nationwide Insurance Co., the liability carrier for 
Thomas Stengel, and $300,000 paid to plaintiff by American 
States Insurance Co., the underinsured motorist carrier for 
Stephen Peterson) against any judgment based on the 
defendant's vicarious liability for the acts of Thomas Stengel. 
Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; at Brief of Petitioner, 
Addendum Exhibit 3; Record Index at pp. 352-54. 
Thereafter, Mr. Peterson filed a Petition with this Court seeking permission to 
appeal the interlocutory Order granting Swire's Partial Summary Judgment regarding the 
6 
effect of the Release and/or credit of $350,000.00.5 Mr. Peterson's Petition was granted 
by Chief Justice Richard C. Howe on November 9, 2000. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Statement of Relevant Undisputed Material Facts For Appeal 
For purposes of this appeal, Defendant submits the following statement of 
undisputed facts:6 
1. On Wednesday February 12, 1992, at approximately, 10:00 a.m., Mr. 
Peterson was driving along 900 East in Salt Lake City at approximately 2800 South and 
was involved in a head-on collision. See Amended Complaint at f 4; Record Index at p. 
9. 
2. The vehicle which collided with Mr. Peterson's vehicle was being driving 
by Mr. Stengel and was owned by his wife, Susan Stengel. See id.; see also Record 
Index at p. 218. 
3. At the time of the accident, Mr. Stengel was employed by Defendant Swire 
as a merchandiser. See Amended Complaint at f 8, Record Index at p. 10. 
5
 In his Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order, Mr. Peterson did not seek 
permission to appeal that part of Judge Dever's Order dismissing Mr. Peterson's punitive 
damages claim, nor has Mr. Peterson contested the ruling on punitive damages. 
Accordingly, Swire has no need to argue for affirmation of the Order dismissing Mr. 
Peterson's punitive damages claim. 
6
 Many of the facts set forth in the following facts statement are directly taken from Mr. 
Peterson's Amended Complaint. Swire admitted those facts for purposes of its Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment only, and reserves it right to dispute such allegations should 
the Motion not be affirmed in this appeal. 
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4. It appears that Mr. Stengel was driving on 900 East traveling from one of 
Swire's customer's store to another store when he fell asleep while driving. Mr. Stengel's 
vehicle veered into the opposing lane of traffic and collided with Mr. Peterson's vehicle. 
See id. at f 4, Record Index at p. 9. 
5. Approximately eighteen months after the accident, a Release of All Claims 
(hereinafter "Release") was entered into by Mr. Peterson which resolved his claims 
against Mr. Stengel in exchange for $50,000.00 paid by Mr. Stengel's automobile insurer 
Nationwide. The Release states: 
RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS 
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION OF the payment to me/us 
of the sum of $50,000.00 FIFTY THOUSAND & NO/100 
Dollars, and other good and valuable consideration, I/we, 
being of lawful age, have released and discharged, and by 
these presents do for myself/ourselves, my/our heirs, 
executors, administrators and assigns, release, aquit and 
forever discharge Thomas & Susan Stengel and Nationwide 
Mutual Co. (reserving, however, our rights to be made whole 
through our uninsured motorist coverage under our auto 
insurer, American States Ins. Company) and any and all other 
persons, firms and corporations, whether herein named or 
referred to or not, of and from any and all past, present and 
future actions, causes of action, claims demands, damages, 
costs, loss of services, expenses, compensation, third party 
actions, suits at law or in equity, including claims or suits for 
contribution and/or indemnity, of whatever nature, and all 
consequential damage on account of, or in any way growing 
out of any and all known and unknown personal injuries, 
death and/or property damages resulting or to result from an 
accident that occurred on or about 12^ day of Feb 1992 at or 
near 2800 S. & 9th E -SLC Utah. 
8 
Release of All Claims, Record Index at p. 248. Mr. Peterson, his wife, Gayle Peterson, 
and his counsel, David Goodwill, signed the Release. Id. 
6. After execution of the Release, Mr. Peterson sought underinsured motorist 
benefits from his insurer American States. 
7. American States investigated Mr. Peterson's claim and then paid 
$300,000.00 of underinsured motorist benefits to Mr. Peterson. See Plaintiffs Answer to 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, Answer to Interrogatory No. 
13, Record Index at pp. 270-71; see also Release and Trust Agreement Underinsured 
Motorist Coverage, a copy of which is appended hereto as Swire's Addendum, Exhibit 
"4". 
8. Mr. Peterson and American States, as Mr. Peterson's alleged subrogee, 
filed his action against Swire on or about February 9, 1996 alleging causes of action for: 
1) vicarious liability/respondeat superior for Mr. Stengel's negligence; 2) negligence 
supervision by Swire and 3) punitive damages. See Amended Complaint; Record Index 
at pp. 8-13. 
9. As to his cause of action for vicarious liability/respondeat superior, Mr. 
Peterson alleges that Mr. Stengel was acting within the scope of his employment at the 
time of the accident and Swire "is vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of Thomas 
E. Stengel committed within the scope of his employment." Id. At f 8; Record Index at 
p. 10. 
9 
B. Response To Petitioner Peterson's "Statement Of Undisputed 
Material Facts. 
RESPONSE TO MR. PETERSON'S PARAGRAPH NOS. 1 AND 2: For 
the purposes of this Interlocutory Appeal, Swire does not dispute the facts alleged in 
Paragraph Nos. 1 and 2 of Mr. Peterson's Brief regarding the accident and Mr. Stengel's 
employment at the time of the accident. 
RESPONSE TO MR. PETERSON'S PARAGRAPH NO.3: In Paragraph No 3, 
Mr. Peterson alleges: "Mr. Stengel's supervisor for Coca-Cola [Swire] was told about the 
accident 'two or three hours after the accident.'" For purposes of this Interlocutory 
Appeal, Swire does not dispute the facts alleged in Paragraph No. 3. However, Swire 
asserts that the fact of Mr. Stengel's knowledge of the accident is immaterial or irrelevant 
to Swire's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment which is at issue in this Interlocutory 
Appeal. Mr. Stengel's supervisor's knowledge of the accident does not provide any 
evidence supporting reversal of the district court's ruling enforcing the Release as to the 
vicarious liability claims against Swire; and/or does not provide any basis that Swire had 
some duty to come forward and reveal itself to Mr. Peterson and his attorneys. The 
evidence is hearsay and is not admissible to prove the contention that Swire knew of Mr. 
Peterson's claim and that he was seeking recovery based on the conduct of Mr. Stengel. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that Swire had any knowledge about any negotiations 
between Mr. Peterson and Mr. Stengel's insurer Nationwide. 
10 
RESPONSE TO MR. PETERSON'S PARAGRAPH NO. 4: In Paragraph No 4, 
Mr. Peterson alleges: "Stephen L. Peterson was unconscious from the time he was hit 
head-on until he came into the hospital." Swire disputes this fact as the records and 
evidence in this case are inconsistent regarding whether Mr. Peterson was unconscious at 
the scene of the accident and, if so, for how long he was unconscious. 
Nonetheless, even if this fact were true, Swire denies that such fact is in any way a 
material fact affecting Swire's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment which is before the 
Court on Interlocutory Appeal. Mr. Peterson's level of consciousness after the accident 
does not provide any evidence as to or reason why he or his attorneys did not know or 
find out that Mr. Stengel was employed by Swire at the time of the accident; and does not 
provide any evidence supporting reversal of the district court's ruling enforcing the 
Release as to Mr. Peterson's cause of action against Swire for respondeat 
superior/vicarious liability. 
RESPONSE TO MR. PETERSON'S PARAGRAPH NO. 5: For the purposes of 
this Interlocutory Appeal, Swire does not dispute the facts alleged in Paragraph No. 5 of 
Mr. Peterson's Brief regarding the Release signed on August 4, 1993 by Mr. Peterson, his 
wife Gayle C. Peterson, as well as their attorney, David A. Goodwill. Those signatures, 
along with the terms of the Release, provide proof that as a matter of law the Release is a 
release of Mr. Peterson's cause of action against Swire for respondeat superior/vicarious 
liability. 
11 
RESPONSE TO MR. PETERSON'S PARAGRAPH NO. 6: In Paragraph No. 6, 
Mr. Peterson alleges: "American States Insurance recognized the extensive nature of Mr. 
Peterson's injuries and paid their underinsured motorist coverage policy limits of 
$300,000 on the understanding that Mr. Stengel only had $50,000 of insurance or back up 
coverage." Swire does not dispute the fact that American States paid underinsured 
motorist coverage to Mr. Peterson. However, Swire disputes the remaining allegations 
that American States "recognized the extensive nature of Mr. Peterson's injuries"; and 
paid the $300,000 "on the understanding that Mr. Stengel only had $50,000 of insurance 
or back up coverage." 
Mr. Peterson does not support the foregoing allegations with any citation to the 
record or other supporting evidence and therefore should be disregarded for purposes of 
reviewing the district court's grant of partial summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. 56(e) 
("When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, 
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."). 
Furthermore, the allegation that American States paid the $300,000 "on the 
understanding that Mr. Stengel only had $50,000 of insurance or back up coverage." does 
not provide any evidence supporting reversal of the district court's ruling enforcing the 
Release as to Mr. Peterson's cause of action against Swire for respondeat 
12 
superior/vicarious liability; and does not provide any evidence supporting reversal of the 
district court's alternative ruling that Swire is entitled as a matter of law to a credit of 
$350,000 against any judgment based on the Swire's vicarious liability for the acts of 
Thomas Stengel. 
RESPONSE TO MR. PETERSON'S PARAGRAPH NOS. 7: In Paragraph 
No. 7, Mr. Peterson alleges that his attorney, David A. Goodwill, first learned that Mr. 
Stengel was employed by Swire on the day of the accident "[i]n the fall of 1994, when 
finalizing settlement negotiations with American States . . . .,f Mr. Peterson alleges that 
Mr. Goodwill learned this information during a telephone conversation with Mr. Stengel. 
Swire neither admits nor denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 7. 
Nonetheless, such facts, if true, are immaterial to determining whether or not to affirm 
the district court's grant of Partial Summary Judgment which is before the Court on 
Interlocutory Appeal. Mr. Stengel's employment relationship with Swire was readily 
discoverable to Mr. Peterson , his counsel, or American States and there is no evidence 
that such fact was being hidden by Mr. Stengel, Swire or anyone else. Mr. Peterson, his 
counsel and American States appear to have failed to inquire into the possibility of 
employment and such failure is a mistake solely on the part of them. That unilateral 
mistake cannot void enforcement of the Release as to Swire. See supra Argument at pp. 
34-36. 
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RESPONSE TO MR. PETERSON'S PARAGRAPH NO. 8: In Paragraph No. 8, 
Mr. Peterson alleges that his attorney, David A. Goodwill, "did not have any knowledge 
or record of the employment relationship between Thomas Stengel and [Swire]." Again, 
Swire neither admits nor denies the foregoing fact, but asserts that such fact is immaterial 
to determining whether or not to affirm the district court's grant of partial summary 
judgment because Mr. Stengel's employment relationship with Swire was readily 
discoverable to Mr. Peterson, his counsel and American States. There is no evidence that 
such fact was being hidden by Stengel, Swire or anyone else. Mr. Peterson, His counsel 
and/or Swire appear to have failed to inquire into the possibility of employment and such 
failure is a mistake solely on the part of Mr. Peterson. Mr. Peterson's unilateral mistake 
cannot void enforcement of the Release as to Swire. See supra Argument at pp. 34-36. 
RESPONSE TO MR. PETERSON'S PARAGRAPH NO. 9: In Paragraph No. 9, 
Mr. Peterson alleges facts regarding his mental and work capabilities since being injured 
in the accident. Swire strongly disputes the alleged facts and their support of a claim of 
incompetency, but also alleges that such facts are not material facts in determining 
whether or not to affirm the district court's grant of Swire's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. 
Those facts do not provide any evidence supporting or discrediting the 
enforceability of the Release as it relates to Swire or alternatively entitling a credit of 
14 
$350,000.00 as to any judgement Mr. Peterson's may obtain as to his cause of action for 
vicarious liability/respondeat superior against Swire. 
RESPONSE TO MR. PETERSON'S PARAGRAPH NO. 10: In Paragraph No. 
10, Mr. Peterson alleges: "On December 8, 1997, Judge Homer Wilkinson of the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, appointed Gayle C. 
Peterson as conservator of the estate of the protected person Stephen L. Peterson." Swire 
acknowledges that an ex parte Order appointing Ms. Peterson as Mr. Peterson's guardian 
was executed by Judge Wilkinson in December 1997,7 however such fact is not a 
material in determining whether or not to affirm the district court's grant of Swire's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Appointment in December 1997, occurring 
four years after the Release was executed, does not establish that Mr. Peterson was 
incompetent at the time he executed the Release in August 1993; and does not provide 
any evidence demonstrating that the Release is unenforceable as it relates to Swire. 
The Petition and Order of Appointment of Guardian for Mr. Peterson by a Third 
Judicial District Court Judge were filed and executed after the above-referenced action 
was filed and was done ex parte without notice to Swire. See Order of Appointment of 
Guardian for Stephen L. Peterson, a copy which is appended as Exhibit 2 of the 
Addendum to this Brief. Swire did not learn of the Order of Appointment until Mr. 
Peterson filed his Memorandum In Opposition to Swire's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment in June of 2000. Swire disputes the merit of the Appointment and its finding 
that Mr. Peterson is incompetent. The medical evidence in this case do not support a 
finding of incompetency, and Swire contends that the appointment was obtained for 
strategic reasons. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In this action for recovery of damages due to the February 12, 1992 automobile 
accident, Mr. Peterson alleges causes of action against Swire for: 1) vicarious 
liability/respondeat superior based on the alleged negligence of Mr. Stengel in operating 
his automobile; and 2) liability based on the alleged negligence of Swire's own conduct in 
hiring, training and supervising Mr. Stengel. Prior to this suit, Mr. Peterson settled with 
and received compensation for his claims based on Mr. Stengel's negligence in the 
amount of $350,000.00. (settlement with Mr. Stengel's automobile liability insurer for 
$50,000.00, releasing Mr. Stengel, and settlement with Mr. Peterson's own insurer for 
underinsured motorist benefits of $300,000.00). Utah law and equity requires that the 
foregoing settlement and compensation shall be accounted and given affect in this suit by 
dismissal of Mr. Peterson's first cause of action for vicarious liability/respondeat superior 
against Swire based solely on the negligence and liability of Mr. Stengel; or in the 
alternative, requiring a set off or reduction of damages in the amount of $350,000.00 if 
awarded at trial for the cause of action of vicarious liability/respondeat superior. 
The district court granted summary judgment on both of the foregoing bases. The 
foregoing argument demonstrates that the district court's ruling is both factually and 
legally correct and should be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE RELEASE EXECUTED BY MR. PETERSON RELEASES 
SWIRE FROM PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY/RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR. 
Utah law provides that an employer's vicarious liability under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior "arises not as a result of any actual negligence by the employer" but 
because of the employer's employment of the employee. Nelson on Behalf of Hirschfeld 
v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 935 
P.2d 512, 513 (Utah 1995) (quoting Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d 1349, 1351 (Utah 
1986)). The employee is primarily liable to the tort victim, and the employer is liable in a 
derivative or secondary manner for an employee's act. 
Consequently, when a victim settles and releases an employee for his/her negligent 
acts, Utah courts and courts from other jurisdictions have historically found that the 
release acts as a release of the principal or employer for claims based on respondeat 
superior. See Holmstead v. Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc., 493 P.2d 625 (Utah 1972); 
Jacobsen v. Parrill. 351 P.2d 194 (Kan. 1960); Dickey v. Estate of Meier, 197 N.W.2d 
385 (Neb. 1972); Melo v. National Fuse And Powder Co., 267 F.Supp. 611 (D. Colo. 
1967) (applying Utah law and Utah's Joint Obligations Act) Seaboard A.L.R. Co. v. 
Coastal Distributing Co., 273 F.Supp. 340 (D.S.C. 1967) (applying South Carolina law). 
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Many of the courts' decisions are based upon interpretation of the Uniform Joint 
Obligations Act, as adopted by the respective states. In Holmstead, the Utah Supreme 
Court justified dismissal of a plaintiffs cause of action against an employer based upon 
the plaintiffs release of and settlement with the employee. In making that determination, 
this Court stated that the employer's "liability was merely derivative and secondary; the 
exoneration of servant, Allen, prevented the imputing of his negligence to the 
[employer]." Holmstead, 493 P.2d at 628. 
Most, if not all, of the foregoing decisions occurred prior to the adoption and 
acceptance of comparative fault law, which abolishes the concept of joint and several 
liability for tortfeasors. However, comparative fault law does not affect the joint and 
derivative nature of liability found within the doctrine of respondeat superior/vicarious 
liability. Therefore, the reasoning behind Holmstead and the other case law holding 
enforcement of a release of an employee as a release of the employer remains good law. 
Indeed, in 1995, this Court faced the issue of whether Utah's comparative fault law, the 
Utah Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 et seq,, affects the law of 
respondeat superior and the enforcement of a release of an employee as a release of the 
employer also. Nelson on Behalf of Hirschfeld v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Dav Saints, 935 P.2d 512 (Utah 1995). 
In Nelson, a teenage boy was seriously injured at a church youth activity when his 
adult supervisor, Crabtree, fell on him. The plaintiff filed suit against Crabtree, alleging 
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negligence, and also against the Corporation of the Presiding Bishopic of Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints ("Church") under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
Plaintiff settled with Crabtree by entering into a general release and hold harmless 
agreement. The release expressly provided that the plaintiff did not intend to release the 
Church by executing the agreement and specifically reserved all claims against the 
Church. Id. at 513. The Church moved for summary judgment asserting that the 
agreement release it, as a matter of law, from the plaintiffs claims of respondeat superior. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Church. 
The issue briefed by the parties on appeal was whether Section 78-27-42 of the 
Utah Liability Reform Act, which states that release of one or more defendants "does not 
discharge any other defendant unless so provides", applies to determine the effect of the 
release agreement in the case. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-42 (1953 as amended). 
However, rather than deciding the effect of the release based upon Section 78-27-42, this 
Court decided the issue under Utah's Joint Obligations Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 15-4-1 el 
seq. The Court stated that "since the LRA [Liability Reform Act] does not address 
vicariously liable parties, section 15-4-4 [of the Joint Obligations Act] now applies to 
those parties." Nelson, 935 P.2d at 514 n.3. 
The Court then found that Section 15-4-4 of the Joint Obligations Act provides an 
exception to the common law finding of joint release of co-obligors where the 
obligee/victim "in writing expressly reserves his rights against one co-obligor." Id. The 
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Majority Opinion, under Justice Durham, held that the exception within Section 15-4-4 
applied in the case, since the release specifically expressed plaintiffs intent to reserve all 
claims against the Church as Crabtree's principal. The court, therefore reversed summary 
judgment finding that the plaintiff only released the agent tortfeasor Crabtree, and the 
release did not have the effect of releasing the Church. Id. 
Based upon the reasoning set forth in Nelson, Holmstead and other cases 
regarding enforcement of releases as applied to this case, and pursuant to the Joint 
Obligations Act, the Release Mr. Peterson signed to settle the negligence of Mr. Stengel 
applies to Swire to release Mr. Peterson's claim of vicarious liability/respondeat superior 
against it. Unlike the facts in Nelson, Mr. Peterson did not, in executing the Release of 
All Claims, expressly reserve his right to pursue a claim against Swire or any claim of 
vicarious liability/respondeat superior. Rather, the Release states: 
I/we, being of lawful age, have released and discharged, and 
by these presents do for myself/ourselves, my/our heirs, 
executors, administrators and assigns, release, aquit and 
forever discharge Thomas & Susan Stengel and Nationwide 
Mutual Co. (reserving, however, our rights to be made whole 
through our uninsured motorist coverage under our auto 
insurer, American States Ins. Company) and any and all other 
persons, firms and corporations, whether herein named or 
referred to or not, of and from any and all past, present and 
future actions, causes of action . . . resulting or to result from 
an accident that occurred on or about j_2^ day of Feb 1992 at 
or near 2800 S. & 9th E -SLC Utah. 
Exhibit "B" (underlining within). That language specifically states that it releases 
Thomas & Susan Stengel, Nationwide Mutual Co. and "any and all other persons, firms 
20 
and corporation, whether herein named or referred to or not." Id. The Release contains a 
reservation of rights, somewhat similar to the reservation in Nelson, but that reservation 
does not concern vicarious liability, or reservation of a claim against Mr. Stengel's 
employer based on respondeat superior. Rather, the reservation concerns Mr. Peterson's 
contractual right to receive further compensation for Mr. Stengel's negligence through 
underinsured motorist coverage from his own insurer American States. Therefore, the 
release and exoneration of Mr. Stengel releases Swire and prevents imputing Stengel's 
alleged negligent conduct derivatively to Swire. See Holmstead, 493 P.2d at 628. 
Accordingly, the Court should affirm the district court's ruling finding, as a matter of law, 
that the Release of Mr. Stengel releases Swire from Mr. Peterson's first cause of action 
for vicarious liability/respondeat superior.8 
In Nelson, Justice Leonard H. Russon respectfully dissented from the majority 
opinion. Justice Russon reasoned that the enactment of the Liability Reform Act 
implicitly repeals the Joint Obligations Act as it purports to relate to tort liability. Justice 
Russon also found that the Liability Reform Act, specifically Section 78-27-42, does not 
apply to employers who are sued based on respondeat superior/vicarious liability, as the 
Act applies only to defendants who are alleged to be at "fault" for the accident. 
Therefore, Justice Russon concluded that liability and the effect of a release of an 
employee's liability for an employer is controlled by common law doctrine of respondeat 
superior, as set forth in the Holmstead decision. The Holmstead decision holds that "the 
exoneration of [the] servant prevented the imputing of his negligence to [the employer]. 
Holmstead, 493 P.2d at 628; see Nelson, 935 P.2d at 515-517. An application of Justice 
Russon's dissenting opinion to this case leads to the same result that application of the 
Justice Durham's majority opinion in Nelson does; which is that the Release signed by 
Mr. Peterson has the effect of releasing Swire for the cause of action of vicarious 
liability/respondeat superior. 
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II. 
THERE ARE NO FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASES UPON WHICH 
TO HOLD THAT THE RELEASE DOES NOT RELEASE THE CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR VICARIOUS 
LIABILITY/RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AGAINST SWIRE. 
In his Brief to the Court, Mr. Peterson makes several arguments against 
enforcement of the Release as to Swire, which revolve around two primary themes: 1) the 
Utah Liability Reform Act, not the Utah Joint Obligations Act and/or common law 
contract law, applies to and controls this case, prohibiting application of the Release as to 
the vicarious liability claim against Swire; and 2) the release is void and unenforceable 
based on the alleged concealment of the employment relationship between Mr. Stengel 
and Mr. Peterson and/or the alleged incompetency of Mr. Peterson. As demonstrated 
below, each of Mr. Peterson's arguments are flawed and do not provide any basis that the 
Release is not enforceable as to Mr. Peterson's claims of vicarious liability against Swire. 
A. 
The Utah Liability Reform Act Does Not Apply To 
Mr. Peterson's Cause Of Action For Vicarious Liability. 
1. Section 78-27-42 Of The Utah Liability Reform Act Applies To 
Defendants Who Are Defined As Having Fault For Causing Plaintiffs 
Injury. 
In Sections II of Mr. Peterson's Brief, he attempts to distinguish the ruling in 
Nelson claiming that the Nelson Court was not required to address and decide whether 
Section 78-27-42 of the Utah Liability Reform Act applied to circumstances of vicarious 
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liability. In making that argument, Mr. Peterson completely ignores the clear and plain 
ruling of the Utah Supreme Court in Nelson. 
In Nelson, the court faced the exact issue involved in this case, whether a release 
of an agent/employee operates as a release of vicarious liability claims brought against a 
principal/employer, and whether Section 78-27-42 applies to enforcement of releases in 
such situations. The court carefully reviewed the language and effect of the Liability 
Reform Act and specifically found that Section 78-27-42 only addresses release of 
"defendants", who by definition under the Act, are limited to those entities found "at 
fault" for the injury, and "fault" is defined as a breach of legal duty. See Nelson, 935 
P.2d at 514; see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 (1994) (definitions of "defendant" and 
"fault"), Swire's Addendum Exhibit " 1 " . The Court found that since the liability of 
vicariously liable entities is derivative, based upon another entities' fault (their agent's 
fault), and not their own, those entities do not fall within the definition of defendant 
under the Liability Reform Act, and therefore Section 78-27-42 does not apply to them 
(as non defendants) to determine the effect of releases regarding vicariously liable 
parties. Id. 
The Court found that Section 15-4-4 of the Utah Joint Obligations Act addresses 
and applies to vicariously liable entities, because it addresses releases of joint obligors 
and tortfeasors, and vicariously liable entitles are a group of tortfeasors/obligors who still 
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remain under tort law jointly and severally liable for a claimant's/obligee's injuries. 
Therefore, the Court stated: 
We recognized in Krukiewicz that section 78-27-42 of the 
CNA [the Comparative Negligence Act, the predecessor to the 
Liability Reform Act] was a "pro tanto" repeal of section 15-4-
4 of the Joint Obligations Act. To the extent that the LRA 
[Liability Reform Act] still addresses regular codefendants 
who are liable because of fault, the LRA will supercede or act 
as a pro tanto repeal of section 15-4-4 as to those defendants. 
However, since the LRA does not address vicariously liable 
parties, section 15-4-4 now applies to those parties. 
Nelson, 935 P.2d at 514n.3 (emphasis added).9 
Consequently, the Nelson opinion makes it clear that when a court is faced with 
the question of enforcement of a release as to a vicariously liable party, Section 15-4-4 of 
the Joint Obligations Act applies, rather than Section 78-27-42 of the Liability Reform 
Act. Furthermore, the Nelson Court's application of the Joint Obligations Act does not 
hinge on the fact that the plaintiff knew of the principal/agent relationship between 
Crabtree and the Church, as Mr. Peterson claims. Since the present case deals with the 
very question of enforcement of a release as to a vicariously liable party, it is clear that 
9
 Unlike the provisions of Section 78-27-42 of the Liability Reform Act, section 78-27-42 
of the Comparative Negligence Act used the broad term of "tortfeasor" as identifying the 
group to which it applied, rather than the term defendant. Also, unlike the Liability 
Reform Act, the Comparative Negligence Act did not define tortfeasor as a person liable 
because of their fault. Based upon the Comparative Negligence Act's broad terms, the 
Krukiewicz Court found that the Comparative Negligence Act applied to both several 
tortfeasors and joint and several tortfeasors. Those broad terms were repealed and not 
used by the Utah Legislature when it passed the Liability Reform Act in 1986. 
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the ruling in Nelson and its enforcement of the Joint Obligations Act applies to this 
10 
case. 
2. Application Of Section 15-4-4 To Vicariously Liable Tortfeasors Does 
Not Violate Article I Section 24 Of The Utah Constitution. 
Mr. Peterson next argues in Section IV of his Brief that application of Section 15-
4-4 of Joint Obligations Act to vicariously liable tortfeasors, as compared to application 
of Section 78-27-42 to tortfeasors who are liable based on fault, treats these groups 
differently and violates the uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah Constitution, 
Article I, Section 24. Article I, Section 24 provides: "AH laws of a general nature shall 
have uniform operation." Utah Const. Art. 1, § 24. Utah Courts have interpreted Article 
1, Section 24 to "require that a law must apply equally to all persons within a class and 
that statutory classifications must have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of 
a statute. Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 821 (Utah 1991). 
Application of Section 15-4-4 to vicariously liable tortfeasors and application of 
Section 78-27-42 to tortfeasors, who are liable based upon their own fault, is not a 
violation of Article 1 Section 24 because these classifications have a rational basis and 
Mr. Peterson also quotes and cites to the cases Thornock v. Jensen 950 P.2d 441 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) and Child v. Newsom, 892 P.2d 9 (Utah 1995) in arguing that 
Section 78-27-42 of the Liability Reform Act applies to this case, rather than Section 15-
4-4 of the Utah Joint Obligations Act. Both of the rulings in Thornock and Child are 
distinguishable from the facts in this case because neither of those cases deals with the 
effect of a release of a defendant based on claims of vicarious liability. 
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furthers the objectives of each statute. Sections 15-4-4 and 78-27-42 each address the 
objective of enforcing releases such that personal injury claimants are compensated for a 
particular entity's fault, allowing claimants to seek further compensation from other at-
fault entities, but preventing the possibility of receiving double recovery or "two bites at 
the apple". The release of a co-defendant under Section 78-27-42 releases only that co-
defendant based on their fault. The release of a joint tortfeasor under Section 15-4-4 
releases both the acting tortfeasor and vicariously liable tortfeasor based on the fault of 
the acting tortfeasor. Since the joint and vicariously liable tortfeasors are liable only for 
another tortfeasor's fault, the claimant must reserve their right to continue to dispute that 
fault in their release if they choose to continue to pursue the vicariously liable tortfeasor. 
If the claimant does not make that reservation, like the circumstances under Section 78-
27-42, the release acts as a final resolution of compensation for the fault of the acting 
tortfeasor. 
Therefore, the separate treatment of vicariously liable tortfeasors under Section 
15-4-4 is rationally based on the consistent and overall treatment of fault under Utah tort 
law and passes constitutional muster. Application of Section 15-4-4 of the Utah Joint 
Obligations Act to this case is proper and demonstrates that the Release executed by Mr. 
Peterson releases his cause of action for vicarious liability/respondeat superior against 
Swire. 
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3. Section 15-4-5 of the Utah Joint Obligations Act Does Not Apply To 
Prevent The Full Release Of Swire For Vicarious Liability. 
Lastly, with respect to the application of the Joint Obligations Act versus the 
Liability Reform Act to this case, Mr. Peterson claims in Section VII of his Brief that 
Section 15-4-5 of the Utah Joint Obligations Act mandates that Swire is not entirely 
released by the Release. He argues that any judgment found against Swire should be 
reduced to the extent of amounts paid by Mr. Stengel as a co-obligor. In other words, 
Swire receives a credit for amounts already paid to Mr Peterson representing 
compensation for Mr. Stengel's liability. 
Mr. Peterson's claim is erroneous because Section 15-4-5 applies to circumstances 
in which co-obligors have a particular contract or relation in which there is a specific 
division of the obligors' shares (e.g. 50/50 shares) and/or division of the obligors' 
responsibilities. Such contract or relation does not exist here. 
Section 15-4-5 of the Utah Joint Obligations Act states in full: 
15-4-5. Release of co-obligor -- Effect of knowledge of 
obligee. 
If an obligee releasing or discharging an obligor without 
express reservation of rights against a co-obligor then knows or 
has reason to know that the obligor released or discharged did 
not pay as much of the claim as he was bound by his contract 
or relation with that co-obligor to pay, the obligee's claim 
against that co-obligor shall be satisfied to the amount which 
the obligee knew or had reason to know that the released or 
discharged obligor was bound to such co-obligor to pay. 
If an obligee so releasing or discharging an obligor has not then 
such knowledge or reason to know [that the obligor released or 
discharged did not pay as much of the claim as he was bound 
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by his contract or relation with that co-obligor to pay], the 
obligee's claim against the co-obligor shall be satisfied to the 
extent of the lesser of two amounts, namely: (a) the amount of 
the fractional share of the obligor released or discharged, or (b) 
the amount that such obligor was bound by his contract or 
relation with the co-obligor to pay. 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-4-5 (1996) (emphasis added). The use of the language "bound by 
contract or relation" and "fractional share" in describing the obligors' circumstance 
envisions a partnership or relationship with specific divisions of monetary shares or 
ownership or division of responsibilities. 
The relationship and circumstance of Swire and Mr. Stengel, as employer and 
employee, is not the type of co-obligor relation in which the parties have a specific 
division of capital or responsibilities as contemplated in Section 15-4-5. Rather, the law 
of respondeat superior mandates that the employee's liability is primary or 100% to the 
tort victim and the employer's liability is only derivative and secondary._ Therefore, 
Section 15-4-5 has no meaning or application in this case. 
However, even if Section 15-4-5 applies to this case, the payment or "fractional 
share" Mr. Peterson received for the Release is 100% of the liability owed for both Mr. 
Stengel and Swire for Mr. Stengel's negligence; and Swire's fractional share is 0%, 
because Swire's liability is only secondary and derivative, and Stengel bears ultimate 
liability to Peterson and Swire. This application of Section 15-4-5 is why courts find that 
the release of an agent or employee, without a reservation of rights, acts as a release of 
the principal or employer for claims based upon respondeat superior. See Holmstead v. 
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Abbott G.M. Diesel Inc., 493 P.2d 625, 627 (Utah 1972) ("the exoneration of the servant 
removes the foundation upon which to impute negligence to the master"). Accordingly, 
Section 15-4-5 of the Utah Joint Obligations Act does not prevent the full release of Mr. 
Peterson's cause of action for vicarious liability/respondeat superior against Swire. 
B. 
There Are No Facts Or Law Which Justify 
Voiding Or Reforming The Release. 
Mr. Peterson makes several arguments that the Release is voidable and cannot be 
enforced as to Swire. These arguments are based upon misapplied theories of contract 
law and allegations which either have no factual foundation or relevancy to enforcing the 
Release. As such Mr. Peterson's claims fail. 
1. There Is No Basis For Voiding The Release Based On Lack Of 
Disclosure Of Swire's Employment Relationship With Mr. Stengel. 
In Section I of Mr. Peterson's brief, he quotes from the case of Garland v. 
Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107 (Utah 1992) regarding the liability of an undisclosed 
principal, and then claims that Garland stands for the proposition that Swire, as an 
undisclosed principal, cannot take advantage of the Release of Mr. Stengel and cannot 
preclude the liability of Swire. Mr. Peterson's argument is erroneous because Garland 
does not address a circumstance of vicarious liability for a tort and does not concern the 
legal effect of a release. 
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In Garland, plaintiffs brought a quiet title action against developers Floyd Rigby 
and Ray Hall and sheriffs deed grantee Anna Fleischman. In connection with purchase 
of property from developers Rigby and Hall, plaintiffs asserted an election to purchase lot 
28 of a subdivision rather than lot 26, for which they had originally negotiated. Rigby 
and Hall agreed to the lot substitution, but failed to record the deed. It turned out that 
Rigby and Hall did not personally own lot 28, but rather the corporation which they 
owned and for which they were officers, Rimaras, Inc. owned lot 28. After the plaintiffs 
election and purchase of lot 28, defendant Anna Fleishmann obtained a judgment against 
Rimaras, Inc. for $17,000.00. Ms. Fleishmann executed on her judgment against lot 28, 
purchasing the lot at a sheriffs sale. Id. at 108-09. 
Thereafter, the plaintiffs brought the quiet title action. In response to the action, 
Ms. Fleishmann argued that the plaintiffs had no property interest in lot 28 because their 
contract was signed by and under the names of Rigby and Hall, not Rimaras, Inc., the 
actual owner of the property. The trial court rejected Ms. Fleishmann's argument and 
found that plaintiffs rightfully purchased lot 28 from Rimaras, Inc., even though it was a 
undisclosed principal, and therefore Rimaras, Inc. had no property interest in the lot at the 
time of Fleishmann's judgment and Fleishmann did not rightfully acquire the property at 
the sheriff s sale. Id. at 109. 
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Utah addressed Ms. Fleishmann's argument that 
plaintiffs negotiated purchase of lot 28 with Rigby and Hall individually, and not 
Rimaras, Inc. To that argument, the court stated: 
It is well established in the law that a principal is liable for the 
acts of his agent within the scope of the agent's authority 
irrespective of whether the principal is disclosed or 
undisclosed. The fact that an agent acts in his own name 
without disclosing his principal does not preclude liability on 
the part of the principal when his discovered to be such by a 
third party who has deal with the agent. 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency 
§ 320 (1986) This is true even through the third person 
dealing with the agent did not learn of the existence of the 
principal until after the bargain was completed. 
Id. at 110. Based on the foregoing principal of law, the court affirmed the trial court's 
ruling finding that the plaintiffs agreement with Rigby and Hall to purchase lot 28 was 
enforceable and transferred the property to plaintiffs, even though the actual owner the 
lot, Rimaras, Inc. was undisclosed from plaintiffs when the agreement was entered. 
As one plainly sees, the Garland case is factually and legally distinguishable from 
this case and does not, as Mr. Peterson claims, stand for the proposition that Swire cannot 
enforce the Release because it is the undisclosed employer of Mr. Stengel. Garland is a 
quiet title action, involving the determination of whether a contract to purchase property 
is enforceable even though the owner/principal of the property was undisclosed to the 
buyer at the time the agreement was entered and bargain was completed. The Garland 
Court found that the contract was enforceable even though the principal was undisclosed. 
This case is a tort action involving an automobile accident and determines whether an 
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employer can be held liable for an agent's conduct based on the doctrine of respondeat 
superior even though the plaintiff executed a release settling his claim against the agent. 
The Garland opinion does not stand for or provide, as Mr. Peterson claims, that an 
undisclosed principal plaintiff can still sue a principal for vicarious liability/respondeat 
superior even though they have settled their claim against the principal's agent. 
Indeed, the principle set forth in Garland regarding enforcement of contracts 
signed by agents for undisclosed principals corresponds with principles set forth in Utah 
Joint Obligations Act and common law that release of an agent acts as a release of a 
principal with respect to vicarious liability and liability under respondeat superior. 
Accordingly, the Garland case does not support Plaintiffs claim that Swire, as an 
undisclosed principal, should not be able to take advantage of and enforce the Release. 
Moreover, in making his claim to void the Release because Swire was an 
unrevealed or undisclosed principal, Mr. Peterson implies that Mr. Stengel and/or Swire 
had an affirmative duty to step-forward and inform Mr. Peterson of the employment 
relationship and joint liability. There is absolutely no legal basis for holding Swire or 
Mr. Stengel to such a duty. Rather, it is the responsibility of Mr. Peterson, as plaintiff, 
and his counsel to investigate all avenues of liability or face the consequences for failure 
to do so. While Mr. Peterson does not believe it is fair that he faces the consequence of 
executing a Release which contains language identifying those released as "any and all 
other persons, firms and corporations, whether herein named or referred to or not"; it 
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clearly is not fair or equitable under the law to permit Mr. Peterson to settle and release 
claims based on Mr. Stengel's liability, receive compensation from two insurers based 
upon that liability, and then turnaround and relitigate Mr. Stengel's liability for 
compensation from a vicariously liable tortfeasor, whose liability is derivative and solely 
based upon Mr. Stengel's liability. 
2. Mr Peterson's Claim That The Release Is Void Due To His 
Incompetency Is Baseless. 
Mr. Peterson also claims that the Release should be found void because Mr. 
Peterson was allegedly not competent to enter into the Release for himself on August 4, 
1993. As support of that claim, Mr. Peterson provides evidence that in December 1997, 
four years after execution of the Release, Gayle C. Peterson, Plaintiffs wife, was 
appointed as Mr. Peterson's Guardian and Conservator by the Third Judicial District 
Court of Utah. n Evidence of a ruling of incompetency four years after execution of a 
document, without anything else, is not and cannot be proof that a person was 
incompetent at the time of executing a Release four years earlier.1213 
11
 The first time that Ms. Peterson's appointment as Guardian and Conservator came to 
light in this action was during briefing of the summary judgment in the spring and 
summer of 2000, even though Mr. Peterson's physical and mental health has been greatly 
disputed in this case and even though the appointment occurred two and one-half years 
ago. Swire disputes the merits of the appointment as the medical evidence in this case 
does not support a finding that Mr. Peterson is anywhere near incompetent. To the 
contrary, Plaintiff performs in the normal range on virtually all of his neuropsychological 
tests. 
12
 Judge Dever specifically found the subsequent Appointment of Guardianship 
immaterial. In his ruling, Judge Dever stated: "As far as incompetency issue, I don't 
think there's any evidence to establish he was incompetent when he signed. It's four and 
half years later, having a guardian or a conservator appointed for him doesn't establish he 
was [not] entitled to sign the document on the date that he signed it." Reporter's 
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Additionally, in support of his claim for voiding the Release due to his 
incompetency, Mr. Peterson cites and quotes the case Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. 
Co., 699 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah 1985) for the proposition that only general guardians can 
compromise a claim of an incompetent person. However, Plaintiff fails to point out the 
fact that Blackhurst also stands for the proposition that a subsequently-appointed 
guardian or special administrator of an estate can ratify a settlement agreement which 
was signed by a person without authority or capacity to settle, such as an incompetent 
person. Blackhurst, 699 P.2d at 691 (citing Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 
1982)). Ratification by a guardian or representative can be made expressly or impliedly 
and cannot afterward be revoked or recalled. Bradshaw, 649 P.2d at 78. In Blackhurst, 
the Supreme Court of Utah held that a son, who was subsequently appointed as 
representative for his mother's estate, ratified a settlement agreement which had been 
entered into and executed on behalf of his mother by the mother's attorney. At the time 
of execution of the settlement by the attorney the mother had already died, but the 
attorney did not know of that event and his lack of authority. The subsequent 
appointment of the son the representative of his mother's estate and his petition for 
enforcement of the settlement, ratified the settlement agreement. Blackhurst, 699 P.2d at 
691. 
Transcript of Proceedings Hearing, August 8, 2000 at Record Index p. 361 (hearing 
transcript p. 51). 
13
 It is interesting to note that American States' claim of subrogation is based on a 
Release and Trust Agreement for Underinsured Motorist Coverage signed by Mr. 
Peterson on October 24, 1994. If Mr. Peterson was incompetent to sign the Release of 
August 4, 1993, as Mr. Peterson and American States claim, then so too was Mr. Peterson 
incompetent to sign the Release and Trust Agreement and is unenforceable. 
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In this case, the facts are clear that even if Plaintiff was incompetent at the time 
the Release was executed, which Swire greatly disputes, Plaintiffs Guardian, Gayle 
Peterson, ratified the validity and enforceability of the Release. The Ratification 
occurred in two ways. 
First, Ms. Peterson signed the Release at the same time Plaintiff signed the 
Release. Her signature appears directly below that of Plaintiffs signature.14 See Release 
of All Claims, appended as Exhibit 2 of the Addendum to Mr. Peterson's Brief. As a 
signatory party to the release, Ms. Peterson "has the burden to read and understand the 
terms of the contract" and thereafter cannot "assert ignorance or failure to read the 
contract as a defense." John Call Engineering, Inc., 743 P.2d at 1208. Therefore, Ms. 
Peterson's execution of the Release establishes her ratification. 
Second, Ms. Peterson was appointed as Plaintiffs Guardian and Conservator in 
December 1997. At no time during the two and one-half years between her appointment 
and the partial summary judgment had Ms. Peterson been heard to claim that the Release 
was void due to Plaintiffs incompetency. Ms. Peterson's, her attorney's and Mr. 
Goodwill's silence as to the effect of the Release since the guardian appointment is also 
ratification of the Release. Moreover, the Petersons' and their attorneys' silence as to the 
effect of the Release and Mr. Peterson's alleged incompetency during that time is also 
evidence of waiver or estoppel of that defense. See Morris v. Russell 236 P.2d 451 
(Utah 1951) (court found that trial court would have been justified in concluding that the 
question of a party's insanity was waived, not having been timely raised in the case). 
Additionally, David G. Goodwill, counsel for Plaintiff, and counsel for Ms. Peterson 
in the matter of Appointment of Plaintiffs Guardian and Conservator, signed the Release. 
Certainly, Attorney Goodwill, as counsel for Peterson in the settlement negotiations, was 
acting as agent for Peterson and his acts would be binding on Peterson. 
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3. There is No Basis For Voiding The Release Due To Mutual Mistake Of 
Fact. 
Lastly, Mr. Peterson asserts that the Release is voidable and should be reformed 
due to mutual mistake of fact. Mr. Peterson correctly states the three circumstances 
under which a mutual mistake of fact is found in an agreement under Utah law: 
(1) that the instrument as made failed to conform to what both 
parties intended; or (2) that the claim party was mistaken as to 
its actual content and the other party, knowing of this mistake, 
kept silent; or (3) that the claiming party was mistaken as to the 
actual content because of fraudulent affirmative behavior. 
Mabev v. Kay Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287, 290 (Utah 1984). While that is the 
correct standard, none of the evidence in this case points to a mutual mistake of fact. 
Mr. Peterson claims that the first of the three standards is met because neither he 
nor Mr. Stengel intended the Release to act as a release of Swire. That claim is in direct 
conflict however, with the general language of the Release which plainly and 
unambiguously states that Mr. Peterson releases "Stengel" and "and any and all other 
persons, firms and corporations, whether herein named or referred to or not". Had Mr. 
Peterson and Mr. Stengel not intended to release others, such as Swire, they would have 
eliminated that general release language. 
Furthermore, other than his bare allegation, Mr. Peterson has not provided any 
evidence whatsoever to prove that Mr. Stengel did not intend to release Swire.15 To the 
contrary, it was in Mr. Stengel's interest to have his employer released for vicarious 
liability for which Stengel could be sued for indemnity. Although there is no evidence 
15
 Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224, 227-28 (Utah 1983) ("[Allegations or denials in the 
pleadings are not a sufficient basis for opposing summary judgment."). 
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one way or the other showing Mr. Stengel's intentions as to the Release or his knowledge 
of the effect of the Release as to Swire, even if Mr. Stengel had knowledge of the effect 
of the Release, that knowledge does not form the basis for voiding or reforming a 
contract due to mistake. "Generally, one party to an agreement does not have a duty to 
ensure that the other party has complete and accurate understanding of all terms 
embodied in a written contract." John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corporation, 
743 P.2d 1205, 1207-08 (Utah 1987).. There simply is no evidence of mutual mistake as 
to the intention of the parties. 
Equally true is the fact that the other two standards for finding mutual mistake of 
fact are not met. There is no evidence to show that Mr. Stengel knew that Mr. Peterson 
did not know of his employment relationship with Swire, that Mr. Peterson was mistaken 
as to the content of the Release and that Mr. Stengel kept silent about the mistake. Mr. 
Peterson was represented by counsel, David Goodwill, and Mr. Peterson represented in 
the release that he knew and understood the content of the Release. Further, there is no 
evidence that Mr. Stengel concealed or "kept silent" about the existence of Swire as his 
employer. Such claims have no basis in fact, but are mere conjecture which cannot 
prevent summary judgment. Rather, the evidence presented by Mr. Peterson shows that 
neither he nor his counsel ever made inquiry into the possibility that Mr. Stengel was 
working at the time of the accident, which occurred on a weekday morning. 
Accordingly, the evidence only points to, at best, a unilateral mistake of fact, and 
the elements to void or reform a contract based on unilateral mistake of fact are not met. 
In order to reform a unilateral mistake of fact, "the mistake must have occurred 
notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary diligence by the party making the mistake." 
John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1209 (Utah 1987). Here, 
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Mr. Peterson and his counsel did not exercise ordinary diligence in reviewing and 
understanding the language and effect of the Release, or in determining whether there 
were other parties, such as Swire, who could be potentially liable for Mr. Peterson's 
injuries in addition to Mr. Stengel. 
Accordingly, there is no basis for reforming the Release due to mistake of fact and 
there are also no other facts or legal theories which support a finding that the Release is 
void. Therefore, the Release is valid and, as a matter of law, it applies to and releases 
Mr. Peterson's claims against Swire for the vicarious liability of Thomas Stengel. 
III. 
EVEN IF THE COURT DOES NOT ENFORCE THE RELEASE AND 
DISMISS THE VICARIOUS LIABILITY CLAIM AGAINST SWIRE, 
THEN SWIRE IS ENTITLED TO A SET OFF OF $350,000.00. 
If the Court finds that the Release does not release Mr. Peterson's claim of 
vicarious liability/respondeat superior against Swire, then the amount of compensation 
Mr. Peterson has already received for Mr. Stengel's negligence and liability must be set 
off from any amount of damages a jury awards to Mr. Peterson for that cause of action. 
That amount of compensation for Mr. Stengel's alleged negligence is $350,000.00 
(settlement with Mr. Stengel's automobile liability insurer for $50,000.00, and settlement 
with Mr. Peterson's own insurer for underinsured motorist benefits of $300,000.00). 
A. The Law Compels A Set Off of $350,000.00. 
In Nelson, once the court found that the action against the principal Church was 
preserved by the reservation of rights in the release, this Court addressed the issue of the 
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compensation the plaintiff received from the agent tortfeasor. The court stated that if the 
agent has paid the full amount of plaintiffs damages in exchange for a release, "all 
liability is satisfied and there is no cause of action against the master." Nelson, 935 P.2d 
at 514. Plaintiff cannot "recover a windfall by receiving more than his actual damages." 
Id. The court then found that on remand, the principal, if found liable for respondeat 
superior, is only liable for the difference between the total damage figure and the amount 
paid pursuant to the agreement with plaintiff. Id. See also Green v. Lang, 206 P.2d 626 
(Utah 1949) (trial court did not err in applying the Joint Obligations Act and finding that 
compensation plaintiff received in exchange for release one tortfeasor shall be deducted 
from total award of damages received at trial). 
In the present case, Mr. Peterson has already received $350,000.00 in 
compensation for the alleged negligence and liability of Mr. Stengel. Plaintiff first 
received $50,000.00 from Mr. and Mrs. Stengel's automobile insurer, Nationwide 
Insurance Company, pursuant to the Release.16 
Then, after execution of the Release, Mr. Peterson sought and received 
$300,000.00 underinsured motorist benefits from his insurer American States. That 
compensation was based upon Mr. Peterson's insurance policy which provides that 
American States will pay damages which Mr. Peterson is "legally entitled to recover from 
the owner or operator of an 'uninsured' or 'underinsured motor vehicle' because of 
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'bodily injury' sustained by an 'insured' and caused by an accident." American States 
Insurance at Record Index p. 259 (emphasis added). American States paid $300,000.00 
because it found that Mr. Stengel was underinsured and Mr. Peterson would be legally 
entitled to recover that amount from Mr. Stengel because the bodily injury he sustained 
due to Mr. Stengel's conduct in operating his wife's vehicle. The trigger for the coverage 
is the underinsurance of the owner or operator of the vehicle, not the liability or 
underinsurance of those entities which may be vicariously liable for the operator's 
conduct. Should American States have desired to make such interpretation and 
contention regarding their insurance policy, they should have investigated vicarious 
liability and should have contested Mr. Peterson's right to the $300,000.00 underinsured 
motorist coverage. 
Now, Mr. Peterson seeks compensation for the same alleged liability of Mr. 
Stengel and this time he seeks it from Swire, Mr. Stengel's employer, under the cause of 
action for vicarious liability/respondeat superior. Any award found against Swire for 
vicarious liability/respondeat superior is based on Mr. Stengel's conduct and liability; and 
under the Nelson decision should be reduced by the amount of compensation Mr. 
Peterson has already received for such conduct, which is $350,000.00. 
There is no dispute between the parties that Swire is entitled to a set off of the 
$50,000.00 received from Nationwide. 
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B. Utah's Underinsured Motorist Statute And Principles Of Subrogation 
Do Not Provide Any Basis To Defeat The Set Off Of $350,000.00. 
In his brief, Mr. Peterson quotes Utah's uninsured and underinsured motorist 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305, as a basis for not allowing a set off of the 
$300,000.00; and argues, without any explanation or legal support, that Judge Dever 
"obviously misunderstood the nature, purpose and application of the underinsured 
motorist statutory scheme" in permitting the set-off. Mr. Peterson also argues that the set 
off extinguishes American States right of subrogation. Mr. Peterson's Brief at p. 21. Mr. 
Peterson's arguments against the set off fail for two reasons. 
First, Mr. Peterson's argument regarding the underinsured motorist statute and 
subrogation are raised for the first time on appeal. Mr. Peterson did not make any 
argument against the $300,000.00 set off in his memorandum opposing Swire's Motion to 
Partial Summary Judgment, nor did Mr. Peterson's counsel raise at oral argument the 
underinsured motorist statute and American States' alleged subrogation rights as a basis 
for not allowing the set off. See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Partial Summary Judgment at Record Index pp. 277-314; see also Reporter's 
Transcript of Proceedings Hearing, August 8, 2000 at Record Index p. 361 (hearing 
transcript pp. 20-40). Issues, claims and defenses "not raised by parties at trial cannot 
be argued for the first time on appeal." Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 
1996); see also State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Utah 
1996) (court would not consider alternative theory of recovery for underinsured motorist 
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coverage as theory was not raised before the district court); Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. 
v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 880 (Utah 1996) (court declined to consider city's 
argument that statute governing electric service district service areas precluded award of 
lost profits because the argument was made for the first time on appeal); Bangerter v. 
Pouhon, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983) ("It is axiomatic that defenses and claims not 
raised by the parties in the trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal."). 
Since Mr. Peterson did not make the foregoing arguments in front of Judge Dever against 
the set off of $350,000.00, the Court should not consider those arguments now. 
Second, even if the Court considers Mr. Peterson's arguments regarding the 
Underinsured Motorist Statute and subrogation, they fail on the merits. Section 31A-22-
305 of the Utah Code sets out the standard for underinsured motorist coverage and, like 
American States' policy, it addresses coverage based on the owner or operator of the 
underinsured motorist vehicle. Subsection (9) of Section 31A-22-305 provides: 
(9)(a) Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-
22-302(1 )(c) provides coverage for covered persons who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or 
operators of underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily 
injury, sickness, disease or death in limits of at least $10,000 
for one person in any one accident, and at least $20,000 for 
two or more persons in any one accident. 
(b) The named insured's underinsured motorist coverage, as 
described in Subsection (9)(a), is secondary to the liability 
coverage of an owner or operator of an underinsured motor 
vehicle, as described in Subsection (8). Underinsured 
motorist coverage may not be set off against liability 
coverage of the owner or operator of the underinsured motor 
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vehicle, but shall be added to, combined with, or stacked 
upon the liability coverage of the owner or operator of the 
underinsured motor vehicle to determine the limit of coverage 
available to the injured person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9) (1994) (emphasis added). 
The statute provides that it is the underinsurance and liability of the owner or 
operator of the vehicle which determines whether underinsured motorist coverage is 
triggered. That language conforms with the purpose of the statute, which is "to provide 
insurance protection to the insured against damages caused by a negligent motorist as if 
the motorist has another liability policy in the amount of the underinsured policy." 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993). 
The statute does not address the vicarious liability of an employer of an 
underinsured operator or owner, and does not in any way address the rights of a 
underinsured motorist carrier to recover as a subrogee, against the underinsured owner or 
operator, let alone the employer of such person. That vicarious liability is what is at 
issue in this action, and the Underinsured Motorist Statute does not provide any basis for 
denying the set off as mandated by the Nelson ruling. Judge Dever did not, as Mr. 
Peterson claims, misunderstand the nature, purpose and application of the underinsured 
motorist statutory scheme. 
Therefore, Swire's liability and insurance for vicarious liability should not have 
been considered by American States in determining to provide Mr. Peterson underinsured 
motorist coverage of $300,000.00 based on the underinsured motorist statute and 
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American States' policy. Moreover, the total compensation of $350,000.00 already 
received by Mr. Peterson is based on the alleged negligence and liability of Mr. Stengel, 
the same basis for Swire's vicarious liability. Under the Nelson decision and the general 
tort principal that a claimant should not receive a windfall recovery, the $350,000.00 
should be set off from any award against Swire for the cause of action of vicarious 
liability/respondeat superior. 
Lastly, Mr. Peterson argues that the set off extinguishes American States' 
subrogation right to recover $300,000.00 for underinsured motorist coverage. That 
argument assumes that American States has a subrogation right to recover the 
underinsured motorist coverage from Swire. 
Utah courts find that subrogation is a creature of equity, "its purpose is to work out 
an equitable adjustment between the parties by securing the ultimate discharge of a debt 
by the person who in equity and in good conscience, ought to pay it." State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Natl. Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah 1996). Under the 
equitable principles of subrogation, subrogation "may be invoked only in those 
circumstances where justice demands its application, and the rights of the one seeking 
subrogation have a greater equity than the one who opposes him." Transamerica Ins. Co. 
v. Barnes, 505 P.2d 783, 786 (Utah 1972). 
In the present case, the circumstances do not invoke a right of subrogation to 
American States. American States paid underinsured motorist coverage based on the 
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alleged negligence and liability of Mr. Stengel. Swire is sued in this action for vicarious 
liability based on the same alleged negligence and liability of Mr. Stengel. They are both 
derivatively liable for the conduct of the alleged wrongdoer, Mr. Stengel, American 
States based on contract law and Swire based on common law tort principles of vicarious 
liability. Both would have claims against Mr. Stengel for amounts paid because of his 
negligence. They stand on equal footing to the other and this equality does not a create a 
situation which demands application of the subrogation doctrine. 
Accordingly, should the Court not enforce the Release as to Swire, permitting Mr. 
Peterson to seek an award against Swire based upon vicarious liability/respondeat 
superior, the Court should affirm the district court's alternative ruling finding, as a matter 
of law, that any award for that cause of action shall be set off or reduced by $350,000.00. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Swire respectfully requests this Court to affirm the 
interlocutory Order, dated August 8, 2000 which grants partial summary judgment in 
favor of Swire by: 1) dismissing Mr. Peterson's cause of action for vicarious 
liability/respondeat superior against Swire because the Release Of All Claims executed 
by Mr. Peterson on August 4, 1993, had the effect of releasing Swire from any and all 
liability for which it may be vicariously liable for the actions or inactions of its employee 
Thomas Stengel; or alternatively 2) Mr. Peterson may pursue his cause of action against 
Swire for vicarious liability/respondeat superior, however, Swire is entitled as a matter of 
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law to a credit of $350,000 (consisting of $50,000 paid to Mr. Peterson by Nationwide 
Insurance Co., the liability carrier for Thomas Stengel, and $300,000 paid to Mr. Peterson 
by American States Insurance Co., the underinsured motorist carrier for Mr. Peterson) 
against any judgment based on Swire's vicarious liability for the acts of Thomas Stengel. 
DATED this day of July, 2001. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
By 
Dale J. Lambert 
Rebecca L. Hill 
Attorneys for Defendant Swire 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT "1" 
Utah Code Ann. 15-4-1. 
In this chapter: 
(1) "Obligation" includes a liability in tort and contractual obligations; 
(2) "Obligee" includes a creditor and a person having a right based on a tort; 
(3) "Obligor" includes a debtor and a person liable for a tort; 
(4) "Several obligors" means obligors severally bound for the same 
performance. 
Utah Code Ann. 15-4-2. 
A judgment against one or more of several obligors, or against one or more of joint or 
of joint and several obligors, shall not discharge a co-obligor who was not a party to 
the proceeding wherein the judgment was rendered. 
Utah Code Ann. 15-4-3. 
The amount or value of any consideration received by the obligee from one or more 
of several obligors, or from one or more of joint or of joint and several obligors, in 
whole or in partial satisfaction of their obligations of all co-obligors to whom the 
obligor or obligors giving the consideration did not stand in the relation of a surety. 
Utah Code Ann. 15-4-4. 
Subject to the provisions of Section 15-4-3, the obligee's release or discharge of one 
or more of several obligors, or of one or more of joint or of joint and several obligors, 
shall not discharge co-obligors against whom the obligee in writing and as part of the 
same transaction as the release or discharge expressly reserves his rights; and in the 
absence of such a reservation of rights shall discharge co-obligors only to the extent 
provided in Section 15-4-5. 
Utah Code Ann. 15-4-5. 
If an obligee releasing or discharging an obligor without express reservation of rights 
against a co-obligor then knows or has reason to know that the obligor released or 
discharged did not pay as much of the claim as he was bound by his contract or 
relation with that co-obligor to pay, the obligee's claim against that co-obligor shall 
be satisfied to the amount which the obligee knew or had reason to know that the 
released or discharged obligor was bound to such co-obligor to pay. 
If an obligee so releasing or discharging an obligor has not then such knowledge 
or reason to know, the obligee's claim against the co-obligor-shall be satisfied to the 
extent of the lesser of two amounts, namely: (a) the amount of the fractional share of 
the obligor released or discharged, or (b) the amount that such obligor was bound by 
his contract or relation with the co-o9bligor to pay. 
Utah Code Ann. 78-27-37. 
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who is claimed to be 
liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act or omission 
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person 
seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in all its degrees, 
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express or 
implied warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification or abuse of 
a product. 
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or 
reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is authorized to 
act as legal representative. 
Utah Code Ann. 78-27-38. 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by that person. He 
may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose fault exceeds his own. 
However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in 
excess of the proportion of fault attributable to that defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. 78-27-39. 
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to 
find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damages sustained and 
the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person seeking recovery and 
to each defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. 78-27-40. 
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant may be 
liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages 
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant. No 
defendant is entitled to contribution from any other person. 
Utah Code Ann. 78-27-41. 
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the litigation, may 
join as parties any defendants who may have caused or contributed to the injury or 
damage for which recovery is sought, for the purpose of having determined their 
respective proportions of fault. 
Utah Code Ann. 78-27-42. 
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does not 
discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides. 
Utah Code Ann. 78-27-43. 
Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any common law or 
statutory immunity from liability, including, but not limited to, governmental 
immunity as provided in Title 63, Chapter 30, and the exclusive remedy provisions of 
Title 35, Chapter 1. Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or 
impairs any right to indemnity or contribution arising from statute, contract, or 
agreement. 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT "2 
DAVID A. GOODWILL, BAR NO. 1218 
Attorney for Gayle C. Peterson 
2047 E. Rainbow Point Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-1719 
Telephone: (801) 272-9820 
FAX: (801)273-1784 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN 
OF INCAPACITATED PERSON AND 
STEPHEN L. PETERSON, APPOINTMENT OF CONSERVATOR 
a Protected Person. 
Probate No. 973901638 
Upon consideration of the Petition for Appointment of Guardian of Incapacitated 
Person and for Appointment of Conservator filed by Gayle C. Peterson, on the 8th day of 
December, 1997, the Court finds, upon hearing, that: 
1. A qualified person has petitioned for appointment as guardian of the 
above incapacitated person and as conservator of the estate of the protected 
person. 
2. Venue is proper. 
3. Required notices were given or waived. 
4. The above-named person, Stephen L. Peterson is an incapacitated person within 
the meaning of U.C.A. § 75-1-201(18). 
5. It is in the best interest and welfare of the incapacitated person that 
Gayle C. Peterson be appointed as guardian of the person and as conservator of the 
estate of the protected person. 
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6. A full guardianship should be granted because nothing less than a full 
guardianship will be adequate. 
7. All requirements for appointment of a guardian and appointment of 
conservatorship under the Utah Uniform Probate Code have been met. 
THEREFORE: 
1. Gayle C. Peterson is hereby appointed guardian of the incapacitated person, 
and conservator of the estate, to act without bond. 
2. The Court grants a full guardianship. 
3. Said conservator has all authority pertaining thereto. 
4. Upon qualification and acceptance, letters of guardianship and conservatorship 
shall be issued to the said guardian and conservator. 
DATED: A ^ ^ / > /Jjj 
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BY THE COURT: 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT "3 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305 
(c) A covered person in Subsection (7)(b) is not barred against making 
subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections. 
(8) (a) As used in this section, "underinsured motor vehicle" includes a 
vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is covered under a liability 
policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence, but which has insufficient 
liability coverage to compensate fully the injured party for all special and general 
damages. 
(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not include: 
(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the 
same policy that also contains the underinsured motorist coverage; or 
(ii) an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (2). 
(9) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(c) 
provides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages 
from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness, disease, or death in limits of at least $10,000 for one person in any one 
accident, and at least $20,000 for two or more persons in any one accident. 
(b) The named insured's underinsured motorist coverage, as described 
in Subsection (9))a), is secondary to the liability coverage of an owner or operator 
of an underinsured motor vehicle, as described in Subsection (8). Underinsured 
motorist coverage may not be set off against the liability coverage of the owner or 
operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, but shall be added to, combined with, or 
stacked upon the liability coverage of the owner or operator of the underinsured 
motor vehicle to determine the limit of coverage available to the injured person. 
(c) (i) For new policies or contracts written after January 1, 1993, a named 
insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage by an express writing to the 
insurer that provides liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-3-2(l)(a). This 
rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until the insured in 
writing requests underinsured motorist coverage from that liability insurer. 
(ii) In conjunction with the first three renewal notices sent after January 
1, 1993, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall notify the insured of the 
availability of underinsured motorist coverage along with estimated ranges of 
premiums for the coverage. The department shall provide standard language to be 
used by insurers to fulfill the insurers' duty under this subsection. 
(10) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily injury 
sickness, disease, or death of an insured while occupying or using a motor vehicle 
owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the insured, a resident 
spouse, or resident relative of the insured, only if the motor vehicle is a newly 
acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the terms of the policy. Except as 
provided in Subsection (10)(c), a covered person injured in a vehicle described in a 
policy that includes underinsured motorist benefits may not elect to collect 
underinsured motorist coverage benefits from any other motor vehicle insurance 
policy under which he is a named insured. 
(b) The limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two or 
more motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine 
the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one accident. 
(c) If a named insured is injured as a pedestrian or while occupying or 
using a vehicle not described in Subsection (10)(a) and is covered by more than one 
policy including underinsured motorist coverage, the injured person may elect the 
policy under which he collects underinsured motorist benefits. An injured person is 
not barred against making subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable under 
previous elections. 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT M" 
RELEASE AND TRUST AGREEMENT 
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 
In consideration of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NONE/100) paid by 
AMERICAN ECONOMY INSURANCE COMPANY, hereinafter called the 
company, I do release and discharge the Company from any and all 
claims and demands, actions, and causes of action, which I may 
have against the Company under the Under insured Motorist Coverage 
of Policy number 7 02 43 128 244 5, because of bodily injuries 
both known and unknown, including future developments thereof, 
costs, loss of service, companionship, and/or consortium,, expense 
and compensation, and property damage, resulting or to result from 
an accident on or about the 12th day of February, at 23B6 South 
900 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
I have not, without the written consent of the Company, made any 
settlement or prosecuted to judgement any action against any 
person or organization which may be legally liable for bodily 
injury and/or property damage on account of which the Company is 
making this payment. 
In consideration of this payment, I further agree that: 
(a) the Company shall be entitled to the extent of the above 
payment to the proceeds of any settlement or judgement that 
may result from the exercise of any rights of recovery I have 
against any person or organization legally responsible for 
the bodily injury or property damage because of which such 
payment is made; 
(b) I shall hold in trust for the benefit of the Company all 
rights of recovery which I shall have against such other 
person or organization because of the damages which are the 
subject of claim made under this Underinsured Motorist 
Coverage; 
(c) I shall do whatever is property to secure such rights and 
shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such "rights; 
(d) if requested in writing by the Company, I shall take, through 
any representative designated by the Company, such action as 
may be necessary or appropriate to recover such payments as 
damages from such other person or organization, such action 
to be taken in my name;' in the event of such recovery, the 
Company shall be reimbursed out of such recovery for 
expenses, costs and attorney's fees incurred by it in 
connection therewi th; 
(e) I shall execute and deliver to the Company such instruments 
and papers as may be appropriate to secure my rights and 
obligations and those of the Company established by this 
provision. 
Witness mv hand and seal this 
SIGNING 
Address 
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